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Abstract 
Social scientific research has made a very substantial contribution to specialist academic 
understanding of crime and its control. This chapter sketches out that contribution that has been 
made in three areas: our understanding of crime trends; our knowledge of policing and its effects of 
crime; and the factors that encourage people to comply with the law.  The ways in which 
practitioners and academics think about these issues has been transformed over the last half-
century, and social scientific research is a significant factor in achieving this transformation. 
However, the same research has achieved a much more tenuous hold on political and public 
discourse about crime, and the chapter concludes with a discussion of the reasons for this, and 
offers some thoughts on how social science should aim to extend its reach into highly politicised 
issues such as “law and order”.  
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Introduction 
This chapter focusses on the contribution that social scientific research has made to our 
understanding of crime and its control. As a British criminologist, my focus is on Anglophone 
criminology, which means – largely but not entirely – Anglo-American work. I have attempted not to 
be parochial in drawing solely on the British experience. As a discipline (or perhaps a sub-discipline, 
or a multi-disciplinary fusion of the sociology of deviance, the psychology of offending and criminal 
law) criminology is a fairly recent invention, which can be dated to the 1950s in the UK and the US. I 
shall argue that its impact on academic understanding of the issues has been substantial. Until the 
immediate post-war period, the police, prosecutors and judiciary in industrialised countries were 
hidden effectively from research scrutiny. I shall summarise developments since then in three areas 
of criminological research: 
 crime trends and social indicators of crime 
 police work and the impact of the police on crime 
 the role of normative compliance in explaining conformity with the law. 
It is hard for someone starting a career in criminology today to appreciate the full extent to which 
academic knowledge has developed over the last five or six decades. For all this achievement, 
however, the impact of academic work on criminal justice policy remains quite marginal. In part this 
is because – in the UK context at least – the centre of gravity of academic criminology for much of 
this period has been characterised by critical commentary1. But academic reticence to engage with 
policy is only part of the story:  at the same time that research has made great progress, “law and 
order” has become an increasingly politicised issue, notably in the UK and the US, but also in some 
mainland European countries. The status of academic criminologists in government in the corridors 
of power has been in decline, and the voice of the “academic expert” is only one of many, and quite 
a small voice, in public and political debate about crime. The final part of this chapter discusses the 
pressures on politicians to offer populist solutions to the problems of crime and disorder, and to 
misread or ignore what social scientific research has to tell them. 
Inevitably I have been selective in focussing on three themes within criminological research, and in 
doing so have drawn on my own professional interests and experience. I am not claiming particular 
significance for research that addresses these themes. Rather, the research described here is 
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 In its early years the discipline had a symbiotic relationship with Home Office research and policy, and indeed 
it was this closeness that prompted a reaction that involved a more critical stance exemplified by the 
establishment of the National Deviancy Conference in 1968, which has dominated sociological criminology 
ever since.  
intended to be illustrative both of the contribution made by criminological research – and of the 
factors that limit its reach into public and political debate.    
 
Crime trends and the measurement of crime 
Criminology is almost by definition an applied discipline, as the object of study – crime – is 
constructed by social institutions and it would be hard to engage in criminology without discovering 
some impulse either to critique or try to improve the functions of these institutions. Until the 1960s, 
however, there were large gaps in knowledge about crime. The most significant of these was the 
lack of any firm knowledge whatsoever about the extent of crime, and the proportion of crimes 
committed that get reported by victims to the police, and the proportion of these reported crimes 
that actually find their way into police statistics.  Statisticians from Quetelet2 onwards had been 
aware of this, but lacked any viable technology for estimating the ‘dark figure’ of unrecorded crime. 
Edward Troup’s preface to Criminal Statistics of England and Wales, 1894, reads as a strikingly 
contemporary account of the limitations of statistics of crimes recorded by the police (Home Office, 
1896, quoted in Morris, 2001), anticipating more recent commentators, notably Kitsuse and Cicourel 
(1963): 
Not only do the figures fall short of the real number of crimes committed by the enormous number of 
unreported or unknown cases ; but there seems much reason to think that, though the instructions as 
to the mode of collecting them have been made as definite as possible, there is still a tendency on the 
part of some police forces to adopt a very high standard of what constitutes a crime committed  or a 
crime reported to the police, and by this means further to reduce the number of cases entered into 
this column... no doubt it is natural... that they should seek to minimise the amount of unpunished 
crime existing in their district, but such a tendency detracts so much from the value of the returns of 
crime that it almost raises the question whether it worth retaining the returns at all... it should be 
clearly stated that they represent only the crimes known to the police, and do not even approach the 
real total of crime. 
 
The 1965 US President’s Crime Commission marked the start of a step-change in our understanding 
of crime levels and trends. Commissioned by President Lyndon Johnson, this was a response to the 
growth in public concern about crime in America. It was an enormously well-funded enterprise, and 
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 Adolphe Quetelet, the Belgian sociologist and statistician – See Zauberman and Robert ( 2011).   
 
from the outset relied heavily on academic expertise  to assemble reliable evidence about crime. The 
evidence gathering process was wide-ranging, but included a national ‘victim survey’  of 10,000 
adults supplemented by three city-level surveys in Washington, Chicago and Boston. These surveys 
asked representative samples of the population about their experience of a range of different 
crimes, and by aggregating up to the (national or city-level) population could derive estimates of the 
extent of crime independently of statistics collated by the police. They showed that non-reporting of 
crime was extensive, and that the ‘dark figure’ of unrecorded crime was for most offence groups 
very much larger than the police count. 
Partly on the basis of these snapshot surveys the Commission concluded that it was hard to draw 
firm conclusions about trends in crime from crime statistics collated by the police as it was “likely 
that each year police agencies are to some degree dipping deeper into the vast reservoir of 
unreported crime” (President’s Commission, 1967: p30). The Commission recommended a 
programme of research into surveys of victimisation which led to the establishment in 1973 of the 
National Crime Survey (NCS, redesigned and relabelled in 1993 as the National Crime Victimisation 
Survey – or NCVS). The NCS/NCVS was the first large-scale national crime survey that yielded reliable 
estimates of crimes committed against people and their private property independent of police 
statistics. 
The concept of crime surveys took hold quite quickly in other countries. The Dutch Ministry of 
Justice (Research and Documentation Centre) launched a national survey in the early 1970s. In the 
UK the Home Office commissioned the Cambridge institute of Criminology to carry out a crime 
survey in London in 1973 (Sparks et al.,  1977), and launched a national survey in 1982 (Hough and 
Mayhew, 1983, Hough and Maxfield, 2007). The British Crime Survey, initially covering England, 
Wales and Scotland, relied initially on the advice and support of those academics who had been 
involved in the US programme of survey work (notably Al Biderman, Richard Block,  Al Reiss and Wes 
Skogan) but also drew on the experience of researchers in the Dutch Ministry of Justice, Lesley 
Wilkins, David Farrington and others. The survey gradually became institutionalised, growing in scale 
and frequency; it was relabelled the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) in 2012, reflecting 
the fact that separate though similar surveys are now mounted in Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
Crime surveys have now been carried out in most European countries, as well as in Australia and 
New Zealand, and in a range of developing countries. Many of these have used the standardised 
questionnaire and administration methods of the International Crime Victimisation Survey, designed 
specifically to enable cross-country comparative research (see eg Van Dijk et al., 2007).  
These initiatives were, for the most part and especially the US NCVS, in the tradition of social 
indicators research, rather than exercises in theory-building and theory-testing. Some of the surveys 
– notably the BCS/CSEW and the Dutch programme of crime surveys – were however conceived of 
as survey research: information was collected not just on respondents’ crime experience, but also on 
their social and economic status, the types of neighbourhood they lived in, the patterns of their 
everyday ‘routine activities’, their attitudes to crime and punishment and their concerns about 
crime, and their ownership and use of crime prevention technology. Over the years, an increasingly 
fine-grained picture has emerged of variations in vulnerability to crime and the reasons for this.  
However the most valuable contribution made by crime surveys probably remains their ability to 
disentangle changes in levels of reporting and recording of crime from the underlying trend. Figure 1 
uses the CSEW to exemplify this. The top line in Figure 1 shows trends in crimes experienced by the 
population aged 16 or over in England and Wales, as measured by the survey but grossed up to yield 
national figures. The bars at the bottom of the figure show crimes recorded by the police. For much 
of the thirty-year period the two trends have been consistent. However, the police statistics actually 
anticipated the ‘real’ fall in crime that began in 1995, showing a fall from 1993, arguably as a 
consequence of political pressure on senior police to deliver reductions in crime. And secondly, the 
recorded crime statistics show a clear – but artefactual – increase in crime over the six years 
spanning the millennium, reflecting a succession of changes to the ‘counting rules’ issued by the 
Home Office.  The fact that the trend in police statistics over this period was upward whilst the 
CSEW showed falls was exploited to the maximum by politicians. The opposition used the escalating 
police statistics as a political cosh with which to beat the Government3 - even if anyone with any 
statistical literacy could see that this trend was misleading, and simply the result of substantial 
changes in recording practices.  
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 The new counting rules had an especially inflationary effect on violent crimes (cf Hough and Maxfield, 2007).  
Figure 1  Crime trends in England and Wales, 1981-2012  
 
 
Source: ONS (2012)  
 
 
It might be questioned whether this collection of surveys of victimisation can claim to be social 
scientific research. Much of the work has been a-theoretical, often presented as less 
methodologically problematic than it actually is; it has been much criticised on these grounds by 
academic criminologists, notably by Young (2011) whose very overstated, if witty, critique of the 
methods used by quantitative criminologists has been neatly undermined by Garland (2012). There 
are other limitations to the use of population surveys to measure crime. They are poor at measuring 
rare crimes, ‘victimless’ crimes and those with institutional rather than individual victims. They are 
good at capturing ‘crimes of the poor’ – burglary, car theft and street robbery – and bad at capturing 
‘crimes of the powerful’ – environmental crimes and large-scale banking frauds, price-fixing cartels 
and so on. They may lag behind in the measurement of emerging crimes, such as internet fraud and 
other ‘cybercrimes’. 
 
Whatever their limitations however, their contribution has been significant. Countries with well-
developed programmes of victim surveys now find themselves very much better positioned to 
understand crime trends than they were in third quarter of the 20th Century. Without survey data on 
victimisation in England and Wales, for example, it would have been hard to move beyond 
speculation in discussing crime trends over the last three decades. With the CSEW, we have a 
reasonably accurate estimate of the extent of unreported crime, as least for offences against people 
and their personal property, and we can track shifts in patterns of reporting to the police and 
recording by the police.  
 
The value of survey research of this sort is that they yield social indicators that constitute the 
building blocks for a better understanding about the drivers of crime.  Thus it is clear that in the 
1980s the police statistics overstated the rate of crime increase because the rate at which crimes 
were reported to the police rose – reflecting growth in phone ownership and in insurance cover. In 
the mid-1990s, it seems that the rate at which reported crime were recorded by the police fell – 
perhaps reflecting political pressure on the police to meet new crime targets.  In the late 1990s and 
early 2000s recording rates grew again, and there is some indication that recording rates have been 
falling off since the early 2000s, thus exaggerating the fall in crime.  The CSEW findings since 2007 
mean that we are quite well placed to say whether or not the global financial crisis and the 
associated period of recession in the UK had affected national crime rates. In the absence of a 
downward trend from the CSEW, the most obvious conclusion to draw would be that ‘real’ crime 
trends were forced upward by recession, but that that financial cut-backs in police staffing – and in 
their capacity to record crime – over this period had simply served to mask the increase. The CSEW 
permits us to reject this – albeit sociologically persuasive – theory with some degree of confidence 
(cf van Dijk, 2013)4. Crimes against individuals and their property  have continued to fall throughout 
the financial crisis, even if there is some evidence that the police statistics have overstated the rate 
of this fall (ONS, 2013). 
 
If crime surveys have improved academic and professional understanding of crime levels and trends, 
this understanding has failed to penetrate political and public debate about crime. Despite almost 
two decades of falling crime, the CSEW shows that majorities of the population think that nationally 
crime is still rising – even if majorities think that crime is falling in their neighbourhood. Until very 
recently neither the mass media nor politicians were prepared to accept that crime has been in 
decline. It would appear that pessimism about falling standards of behaviour is very deeply ingrained 
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 The downward trend in crime – exhibited by many developed countries – stands in need of explanation, and 
criminologists have not (yet) done a good job here. Improved security and better anti-theft design is clearly 
part of the story.  To some extent the growth in crimes poorly measured by both police statistics and surveys 
will have offset the falls in conventional ‘volume’ crimes like burglary and vehicle crime, but the new forms of 
crime almost certainly involve different victims and offender groups than the traditional ones.   
into the public and political consciousness. We shall return to this issue, and its implications, at the 
end of the chapter. 
 
Police work and the impact of the police on crime 
 
 
Crime surveys exploited developing survey technology to provide answers to questions that had 
historically been easy to ask but hard to answer – clearly occupying  the Rumsfeld-ian territory of  
‘known unknowns’.  By contrast, social research into policing has proved much more iconoclastic, 
revealing that policing institutions function in ways that are substantially at odds with received 
wisdom – charting ‘unknown unknowns’. Until the 1960s the police in most developed countries 
were largely closed to independent or academic scrutiny, which enabled them to define their own 
role – or public perceptions of this role. This changed in the early 1960s in the US and the UK, and 
somewhat later in mainland Europe. In 1980 Ron Clarke and I characterised this body of research as 
undermining professional and popular assumptions about the police, which we called the ‘rational 
deterrent’ model of policing (Clarke and Hough, 1980, p2). The key assumptions of this model were 
that: 
 
 the police were the primary agents of social control 
 that social control and crime control were synonymous 
 that police work was mainly to do with crime fighting and the deployment of deterrent 
strategies.   
 
More recently Reiner (2012) has described this process as a dialectic one. He identifies as the thesis 
the popular (and political/media) conception of the police and crime busters; the antithesis was 
formed by research showing that only a minority of police time was spent on crime, that the crime 
dealt with by the police was largely reported to them by the public, and that their deterrent impact 
was marginal. He describes the academic synthesis of these two positions as presenting the police as 
an emergency service with a capacity to deploy coercive force, whether to deal with crime or to 
resolve other problems that require immediate attention.  
 
The sociological policing research of the 1960s and 1970s was genuinely path-breaking. Key pieces of 
work include Reiss’  (1971) detailed observational research of police at work in the US, and work in 
the UK by Banton (1964); both studies showed the wide range of demands, most of them non-
criminal, made on the police. Punch’s (1979) work characterised the police as a ‘secret social 
service’. Egon Bittner’s (1970, 1974) work remains very widely cited as providing an important 
redefinition of the police mandate; his two most quoted passages are probably his characterisation 
of police work as, “something-that-ought-not-to-be-happening-and-about-which-somone-had-
better-do-something-now!” (1974, p.30), and his statement of the unique competence of the police:  
 
The specific capacity of the police is wholly defined in their capacity for decisive action… More 
specifically,  that the feature of decisiveness derives from the authority to overpower opposition in 
the “then and there” of the situation of action. The policeman, and the policeman alone, is equipped, 
entitled, and required to deal with every exigency in which force may have to be used to meet it” 
(Bittner, 1974, p.35). 
 
Bittner’s account of the police as an emergency service whose effective delivery relied on the 
capacity of deploying coercive force was consistent with accounts of what the police in developed 
countries actually do. Manning’s  (1977) influential account of policing in London confirmed the 
disjunction between the reality of day-to-day police work and the idea of policing as crime-busting 
that is embedded in political and media discussions of policing. He argued that the police were 
engaged in “the dramatic management of the appearance of effectiveness” and that whatever effect 
they had on people’s offending, this was mediated through symbolism – in other words, that an 
important dimension of policing operates at the symbolic level.  
 
If these studies demonstrated that police work actually bore little resemblance to rational-deterrent 
crime-fighting, a series of important experimental US studies also showed that crime levels were 
unaffected by changes at the margin5 in levels of car and foot patrol (see especially Kelling et al., 
1974; Pate et al., 1976 and Clarke and Hough, 1985 for a summary). Yet further work suggested that 
the detective function was less one of systematic sifting of evidence that eventually identified the 
culprit, and more one of collecting straightforward evidence from victims and witnesses who had 
already identified the offender6 (Greenwood et al., 1980).   
 
Many of these studies from the third quarter of the twentieth century are now classics of social 
science research into policing, and remain as essential reference points for modern academic 
scholarship in the field. The argument that changing levels of police resources or policing strategies 
achieves at best small gains at the margin in terms of reduced crime remains broadly accepted (cf. 
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 Few would argue that there is no impact in gross changes in police levels, for example when saturation 
patrolling is introduced, or all polie presence is removed as in the case of police strikes. 
6
 This is not to suggest that detections never result from careful sifting of forensic evidence, and techniques 
such as DNA testing make such cases more frequent. But they did not – and very probably still do not 
represent the typical route to detection.  
Bradford, 2012).The synthesis offered by Reiner (2012) stressing the role of the police as responding 
to emergencies would probably command widespread agreement from academic criminologists. It is 
significant, nevertheless, that most of the studies cited here were published in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Subsequent work has served to refine or develop sociological perspectives on the police function, 
but not to radically reshape the field. Indeed the political task facing academic criminologists 
working in this area has been to convey the same message to successive generations of politician – 
that the police function is complex, multi-faceted and less centrally to do with crime control that is 
popularly assumed. 
 
Research into normative compliance in explaining conformity with the law 
 
The third research theme to be considered here is work on the role of institutions in securing 
normative compliance (cf. Bottoms, 2002). This can be seen as a natural development of research 
challenging an overly simple ‘rational deterrent’ conception of police function, in providing a fuller 
account of the processes by which compliance with authority is actually secured. Procedural justice 
theory has its roots in Weberian and Durheimian sociology but emerged in the US over the last 
twenty five years  (Tyler, 2006, 2011a, 2011b; Tyler and Huo, 2002). It has tended to contrast 
instrumental and normative mechanisms for securing compliance, proposing that in many areas of 
behaviour, people’s behaviour is guided by normative rather than instrumental considerations. The 
key propositions of procedural justice theory are that the institutions of justice can shape – to some 
extent – the norms that guide people’s behaviour and that treating people fairly is the key to doing 
so. Trust and legitimacy are central concepts: it is proposed that fair treatment by those wielding 
authority builds trust; that trust confers legitimacy on the institution in question; and that if those 
who are subject to its authority confer legitimacy on it, they will comply with its requirements. 
Procedural justice theory has the – somewhat paradoxical – attraction of providing an instrumental 
justification for ensuring that the justice system acts with decency, fairness and legality. 
 
The large body of US evidence is being increasingly supplemented by UK theorising and empirical 
work (eg (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Hough et al., 2013; Jackson et al, 2012a; Jackson et al, 2012b; 
Tankebe, 2013), to support procedural justice theory. Much of this relies of population surveys, 
which consistently demonstrate the expected correlations between fair treatment, trust, perceived 
legitimacy and compliance. There is rather less experimental research testing  whether these 
relationships are in fact causal though the work that has been done has been positive (notably  
Mazerolle et al., 2013). Our own work (Hough and Sato, 2011; European Social Survey, 2011, 2012; 
Jackson et al., 2012; Hough et al., 2013) has used the European Social Survey to examine variations 
across country; again we have replicated the hypothesised relationships between perceptions of fair 
treatment, trust, legitimacy and compliance, but we have also found that ‘moral alignment’ between 
institutions and those over whom they exercise authority is a critical legitimating factor, as proposed 
by Beetham (1991). That is, people are more likely to confer legitimacy on the police or the courts if 
they believe that these operate to the same moral values as themselves.  
 
It is hard for someone immersed in a particular field of research to assess what levels of visibility and 
influence this body of work has achieved. In the US procedural justice research appears to be well-
established. Large numbers of papers on the subject are presented at the major criminological 
conferences and the ideas appear to be finding some traction amongst politicians and criminal 
justice managers. Part of the reason for this is that the sheer cost of the reliance of instrumental 
strategies involving mass incarceration is creating pressure to find more financially viable 
alternatives. Another factor may be the fact that procedural justice theory provides a useful and 
appropriate set of concepts to apply to the – increasingly popular – policing strategies that have a 
neighbourhood or community focus.  
 
Research is less developed on this side of the Atlantic. There are various groupings of academics and 
police researchers that are active in the area. In the UK, in addition to our own work with the 
European Social Survey mentioned above, some significant work has been done within and for the 
Metropolitan Police Service in London (eg Jackson et al., 2012a) and the UK National Policing 
Improvement Agency, now the College of Policing  (eg Myhill and Quinton, 2011, Myhill and 
Bradford, 2012). Various national bodies, such as the National Audit Office and Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary have made supportive comments or references to procedural justice. 
Civil servants within the Home Office and Ministry of Justice are familiar with the concepts. But it 
would be wrong to suggest that procedural justice ideas have achieved any real purchase on political 
or media discourse. Even though there has been cross-party support for neighbourhood policing (a 
variant of community policing that has been adopted nationally) politicians justify this not in terms 
of its legitimating capacity, but in terms of a partnership between police and public in “the fight 
against crime”. It would seem that social scientific research can reach into the technocratic parts of 
the process by which justice policy is formulated but has much more difficulty in making itself heard 
amongst politicians. Let us now turn to the reasons for this.   
 
Criminology and politics 
In her first major speech after her appointment in 2010, Theresa May, the UK Home Secretary at the 
time of writing, told senior police officers, "Your job is nothing more, and nothing less, than to cut 
crime"7. This sound-bite neatly incapsulates three key assumptions that the criminological research 
discussed here has called into question: that crime is rising, that police work is solely about crime 
control, and that the police have the capacity to drive crime down. This is not intended as a partisan 
criticism of the current UK coalition government. Politicians from all the main political parties have 
struck similar postures over the last two decades. In the UK (or at least in Westminster politics) 
talking tough on crime is routine for Home Secretaries, Justice Secretaries, Prime Ministers and their 
opposition shadows.  
 
The main reason for this are to be found in the rapid increase in the temperature of criminal justice 
debate, which can be dated to the early 1990s8. The main heating source was provided by year-on-
year increases in recorded crime – averaging six per cent per year in England and Wales for over 
three decades, which not surprisingly was reflected in growing public concern about crime. But a 
more proximate reason was that New Labour was overhauling policy in many key areas, including 
crime, in anticipation of the coming election.  These developments created the pre-conditions for 
the then shadow Home Secretary, Tony Blair, to mount an effective challenge to the Conservative 
Party’s status as “the party of law and order”9. He famously promised to be ‘tough on crime, tough 
on the causes of crime’, initially in early 199310.  The media construed the emphasis to be on the first 
half of the promise, which created considerable pressure on the Government to show similar steel, 
and Michael Howard, the Home Secretary, responded later in the year with his own sound-bite,  
“Prison works”. Since then, the competition between the parties to ‘out-tough’ each other has been 
relentless.  The upshot has been a process of over-simplification of the issues in political (and media) 
discussion of crime – and there has been little patience for academics who insist that things aren’t 
that simple.  
 
This process of ‘politicisation’ and over-simplification has been amplified by two further factors. The 
first of these is the diminished role of the ‘technocratic expert’ in social policy, and a greater 
responsiveness to the voice of the public (cf Giddens, 1991). This trend has been particularly marked 
in countries such as the UK and the US with adversarial political systems, on the one hand, and 
attachment to neo-liberal market principles, on the other. In these countries, political 
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 A metaphor neatly built upon by Loader and Sparks (2011), who explore the scope of various ‘cooling 
devices’. 
9
 Downes and Morgan (2007) suggested that the Conservative Party started this process in 1979, making 
support for the police a key political issue. However, the Labour Party did little to challenge the government’s 
crime policies until 1992.   
10
  Interview on BBC Radio 4 ‘The World This Weekend’, Jan 10, 1993. See also Blair (1993).  
responsiveness to public opinion has taken on an overtly populist quality; in criminal justice, the 
phenomenon of penal populism is well documented, whereby political leaders promote policies 
largely or entirely for the electoral advantage they confer, rather than from knowledge or conviction 
that they are the best policies (eg Roberts et al., 2003).  
 
Intertwined with this has been the development of a ‘small state’ style of governance in which 
politicians specify the outcomes required of state institutions such as the police, usually in the form 
of numerical targets, but leave the detail of the processes to local agencies. These principles of ‘New 
Public Management’ (NPM) are often applied in parallel with processes of ‘marketisation’ – where 
private sector companies compete for contracts to provide public services – and consumer choice – 
where service recipients can exercise control over the services they receive (cf Hood, 1991).  
 
I have argued elsewhere (eg Hough, 2007) that criminal justice policy has suffered badly from the 
combined effects of penal populist and NPM policies. Once politicians adopt a crude and simple 
instrumental discourse about “the war on crime”, they find themselves trapped within its logic  - 
partly because they judge that this is the only one that will be favourably received by the media 
(and, behind them, the electorate); and equally, the logic of NPM has driven politicians to adopt 
simple numerical targets that are built around crime and detection statistics. In combination, the 
increased weight given by politicians to the public voice and the increased uptake of forms of 
governance through numerical target-setting have squeezed out subtlety from political discourse 
about crime and justice.  
 
Whether these trends towards over-simplification of policy and insulation of policy from academic 
research are structural – in the sense of being an inherent feature of politics in late-modern 
industrialised societies – remains to be seen. One school of thought is that the ‘punitive turn’ that is 
a consequence of penal populism is restricted to specific countries with particular political traditions 
and patterns of media ownership. Thus Tonry (2007) has argued that the US – and to a lesser extent 
the UK – are the outliers, and that politicians in mainland Europe can and should resist the pressures 
that draw them away from rational policy. On the other hand, plenty of mainland-European 
criminologists argue that the US and UK are less outliers than the advance guard of a new and 
nastier form of adversarial, media-led politics (eg Sack and Schlepper, 2013).    
 
There is room for a little optimism. In the UK at least, there has been a retreat from the worst 
excesses of NPM, as well as frequent calls for more mature and less adversarial forms of politics. And 
the falls in the main indices of crime across several jurisdictions may have the effect of cooling the 
climate of criminal and penal policy debate. Certainly polls measuring public anxiety about social 
issues have shown a reduction in crime concerns – which appear displaced by concerns about the 
economy. And following a series of media scandals and the Leveson Inquiry (Leveson, 2012), there 
are signs that politicians are prepared to be more robust in their handling of the press.  It is as yet 
unclear as to whether these developments will create more political space for engagement with 
social scientific research.  
 
There are probably things that academic criminologists can do to increase the chances of more 
fruitful engagement with politicians. In the first place, this requires more positive enthusiasm for 
engaging in ‘public criminology’, with a view to improving what Loader and Sparks describes as 
taking on the role of a ‘democratic under-labourer’: 
 
Democratic under-labouring is: committed to both participating within, and to facilitating 
and extending, institutional spaces that supplement representative politics with inclusive 
public deliberation about crime and justice matters, whether locally, nationally or in 
emergent transnational spaces. In this regard, the public value of democratic under-
labouring lies not in cooling down controversies about crime and social responses to it, but 
in playing its part in figuring out ways to bring the heat within practices of democratic 
governance. … If one was to encapsulate all the above in a single phrase it would this: 
intellectual ambition, political humility. (Loader and Sparks, 2010, p. 132) 
 
It is questionable whether the majority of academic criminologists are ready to grasp this role 
enthusiastically. This is because engaging with politicians and their policy officials is quite a time-
consuming process involving the careful building of networks and relationships – which can often be 
distracting from what academics might reasonably see as their ‘day jobs’ – teaching and publishing 
academic works; and reflecting attitudes in the wider public, academia has its fair share of cynicism 
about politicians. However, the incentives that are now being built into the UK funding system for 
higher education include rewards for research that can demonstrate ‘impact’ on policy or on 
broader social well-being. This may focus minds on contributing not only to the body of academic 
knowledge but also to the social good, measured in the short or medium term by contributions to 
the political process. 
 
However, nurturing an ambition to contribute to the policy process is not the same as achieving it. 
Several other preconditions are required. Considerable planning and positioning is usually needed by 
any policy researcher to ensure that their research gets heard by the right people, and there is also 
an element of luck and happenstance in the process. Having something coherent to say is, of course, 
the first requirement. To be able to say it with authority is also important, and building authority in 
the eyes of the right people is a slow process. Timing is a critical factor, as politicians need ideas at 
different points in the political cycle – notably when in opposition and developing a new set of 
policies for the election. Scale can be important, as people tend to set most store by large-scale 
research. And having non-academic allies – or, at least, sympathetic listeners – is critically important, 
whether these are politicians and their advisors, civil servants, think-tanks and lobbying groups, 
criminal justice agencies or journalists. What is undeniably the case – and what is very obvious to 
anyone who has engaged with policy for any length of time – is that criminologists are indeed minor 
players with small voices in the policy arena, and that their research will achieve little if they fail to 
foster, in some way or other, forms of reach into the political process additional to the publication 
process.    
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